Multinational Ownership, Intellectual Property Rights and Knowledge Di¤usion from Foreign Direct Investment by Smeets, R.A.L.M. & Vaal, A. de
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is an author's version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/167453
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Multinational Ownership, Intellectual Property
Rights and Knowledge Di¤usion from Foreign
Direct Investment
Roger Smeets and Albert de Vaal
Nijmegen School of Management, The Netherlands
August 2008
Abstract
In this paper we extend the vertical linkages model by Markusen and
Venables (1999) to include (a) di¤ering degrees of multinational (MNE)
ownership in their foreign a¢ liates and (b) knowledge di¤usion, in addi-
tion to demand and supply linkages. We investigate the intra- and inter-
industry e¤ects of changes in MNE ownership on local rmsproductivity
via demand linkages, price e¤ects and knowledge di¤usion. Moreover,
we also consider the mediating inuence of national intellectual property
rights protection (IPP). Given the ambiguous predictions of our model,
we also investigate these issues empirically in a panel of 1222 large rms
spread out over 20 countries and 18 manufacuring industries during the
period 2000-2005: We nd that in countries with low IPP, the occurence
of intra-industry productivity e¤ects is conditional on the cost structure
of local rms. Moreover, inter-industry productivity e¤ects are largely
absent. Conversely, in countries with high IPP, both intra-industry and
inter-industry productivity e¤ects are high. Also, the relationship beween
productivity e¤ects and MNE ownership varies both within and between
industries, as well as between conditional and unconditional productivity
e¤ects. We interpret this empirical evidence as a conrmation of our the-
oretical conjecture that intra-industry knowledge di¤usion is dominated
by unintended spillovers, whereas inter-industry knowledge di¤usion is
dominated by intended knowledge transfers.
1 Introduction
In an attempt to better disentangle the conditions under which Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) induces knowledge spillovers, academic research has increas-
ingly take into account the heterogeneity of multinationals (MNEs) and their
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foreign subsidiaries (Feinberg and Keane, 2005; Smeets, 2008). Whereas FDI
used to be treated as a rather bulky and homogeneous concept (Lipsey, 2002),
scholars have started to acknowledge the heterogeneity of MNEs in inter alia
investment motives (Girma, 2005; Dri¢ eld and Love, 2007), market orientation
(Girma et al. 2008) and country of origin (Javorcik et al., 2004; Girma and
Wakelin, 2007), and the subsequent consequences for host-country knowledge
spillovers.
A particularly promising strand of research has considered di¤erences in
MNE ownership over foreign a¢ liates as a determining factor of knowledge
spillovers (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Javorcik,
2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). Internalization theory suggests that in-
creased MNE ownership over a foreign a¢ liate induces the parent to transfer
more proprietary knowledge or technology abroad, thus increasing the potential
for knowledge di¤usion (Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982; Davies, 1992). More-
over, studies on MNE input sourcing suggest that increased MNE ownership has
consequences for the extent of local input sourcing, thus a¤ecting the extent of
backward linkages (Tavares and Young, 2006; Javorcik, 2008).
Empirical studies usually distinguish minority from majority ownership (Blom-
ström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2004), or shared ownership from
fully owned subsidiaries (Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) and
indeed nd that the distinction matters. However, none of these studies consid-
ers the e¤ect of MNE ownership as a continuous variable, which veils a lot of the
potential variation. Moreover, although some theoretical studies investigate the
relationship between intra-rm knowledge transfer and MNE ownership (Müller
and Schnitzer, 2006), theoretical contributions on the relationship between MNE
ownership and intra and inter-industry knowledge di¤usion are largely absent.
This paper rst picks up on the latter observation: We introduce shared
ownership between a MNE and a local (host-country) partner in the foreign
subsidiary as a variable of interest in a theoretical model by Markusen and
Venables (1999), and then consider its host-country intra and inter-industry
e¤ects. Specically, in addition to considering only pecuniary externalities,
as is common in most theoretical models, we also consider actual knowledge
di¤usion. In doing so, the analysis explicitly considers two forms of knowledge
di¤usion: First, knowledge spillovers, which are unintended knowledge ows
(i.e. externalities) from the MNE to its host-country environment. Second,
knowledge transfers, which are intended (and internalized) ows of knowledge
from the MNE to its host-country environment. A nal contribution of the
paper is that it also considers institutional heterogeneity - notably intellectual
property rights protection (IPP) - and how this interacts with the two types of
knowledge di¤usion just mentioned.
Our theoretical results demonstrate the opposing inuences of pecuniary
e¤ects, direct and indirect demand e¤ects, and knowledge di¤usion on domes-
tic rms, following from an increase in MNE ownership in foreign a¢ liates.
Nonetheless, we are able to derive some (conditional) unambiguous predictions:
We nd that forward or downstream host-country e¤ects following an increase
in MNE ownership are generally positive, provided that there is su¢ cient up-
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stream competition. Backward or upstream e¤ects are also positive in countries
with high IPP, provided that inter alia downstream demand elasticities and
local input shares are su¢ ciently high. The intra-industry e¤ects are generally
positive in low-IPP countries, provided that the share of xed costs in total
costs of domestic rms is su¢ ciently high.
We then take these theoretical predictions to the data, by employing a rm-
level panel dataset, containing 1222 large domestic rms and 351 foreign sub-
sidiaries with varying degrees of MNE ownership, active in 20 countries and 18
industries during the period 2000-2005. Our theoretical ndings on the inter-
industry e¤ects are largely conrmed by the data. The empirical results on the
intra-industry e¤ects are not entirely in line with the theoretical expectations,
which we argue might be due to some assumptions in the model. Generally
speaking, the empirical results suggest that high-IPP countries are better able
to reap the benets of MNE investment than low-IPP countries.
The empirical part of the paper also provides two methodological advan-
tages over some of the earlier studies already undertaken in this area (cf. Blom-
ström and Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik
and Spatareanu, 2008). First, unlike earlier studies, we utilize a cross-country
sample which allows us to investigate how institutional heterogeneity (such as
di¤erences in IPP regimes) interacts with the relationship between MNE own-
ership and host-country productivity e¤ects. Second, in stead of considering
dichotomous or discrete di¤erences in MNE ownership (e.g. minority versus
majority, or shared ownership versus full ownership), we treat MNE ownership
as a continuous variable in the empirical part as well. Given the ex ante the-
oretical ambiguity of the relationship between MNE ownership and knowledge
di¤usion, next to the usual parametric regression techniques we also employ
semi-parametric regression techniques which allows us to refrain from specify-
ing a specic functional form regarding the relationships of interest.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a theoreti-
cal model, based on Markusen and Venables (1999) and extends it with the the-
oretical elements mentioned above. Section 3 analyzes the within and between
industry-e¤ects of changes in MNE ownership on local rms, and how these ef-
fects depend on the extent of IPP. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology
and gives an overview of the data used in this paper. Section 5 presents the
estimation results of the empirical model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Before discussing the setup of the model, it is instructive to consider Figure 1
below, which presents a schematic representation of the theoretical model. A
MNE sets up a shared foreign subsidiary in sector k in the host economy to
produce for and sell on the local market. As such, it competes with local rms
that are also active in sector k, but at the same time it also spills over knowledge
to these rms. These are intra-industry or horizontal knowledge spillovers. The
industry the MNE invests in may be a downstream industry receiving inputs
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from local rms in j as indicated by situation A or an upstream industry 
delivering inputs to rms in industry l. If situation A is at hand, local rms
active in sector j supply the foreign subsidiary and local rms in sector k with
intermediates, but at the same time also receive knowledge transfer from the
foreign subsidiary, e.g. through supplier assistance (Javorcik, 2008). This type
of knowledge transfer is called backward or upstream knowledge transfer. If
situation B is relevant, the foreign subsidiary and local rms in sector k may
also function as input suppliers themselves, selling intermediates to local rms
in sector l. Simultaneously, these local sector l rms may receive knowledge
transfer from the foreign subsidiary, e.g. in the form of increased input quality
(Javorcik, 2008). Whichever situation occurs, these types of knowledge transfer
are inter-industry or vertical in nature. In addition to vertical knowledge trans-
fer, changes in the demand and supply of goods along the input and output
linkages will cause backward and forward demand e¤ects, leading to pecuniary
spillovers.
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
In what follows we will rst focus on part A of Figure 1. That is, we will rst
consider the situation in which the MNE has a shared subsidiary in the down-
stream sector (k) of the host economy and receives supplies from the upstream
sector (j). After having derived the model for this setup, we will also indicate
how the model changes when considering part B, where the foreign subsidiary
is active in the upstream sector (k), supplying local rms in the downstream
sector (l).
In our model there are two types of rms: Multinationals (m) and national
rms (n), the latter of which can be further classied as local partners (lp),
downstream rms (d) and upstream rms (u). We assume that MNEs require
a local partner to set up a foreign subsidiary in the host country: The resulting
shared subsidiary can be thought of as an International Joint Venture (IJV ).1
This IJV competes with the downstream rm d, and both of them are supplied
by the upstream rm u.
The theoretical model below builds on and extends Markusen and Venables
(1999). These authors develop a multi-sector partial equilibrium model, where
they analyze the e¤ect of MNE entry in a downstream industry on the number of
local rms active in upstream and downstream industries. The e¤ects of MNE
entry work via competition e¤ects and demand linkages (leading to pecuniary
externalities). Our setup resembles theirs in a number of ways: We also utilize
a two industry setup, in which each industry is characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition. Further, we also look at pecuniary externalities via
1A couple of remarks apply here: First, note that we assume that the MNE needs a local
partner, i.e. we do not model the decision between a greeneld versus a shared subsidiary
nor the search process for a suitable partner. Second, even though the shared subsidiary may
be thought of as an IJV , we assume that the national rm is completely absorbed in the
partnership and does not have any remaining operations of its own. From that perspective,
the partnership may have more resemblance to a partial acquisition. Third, we assume that
there is always a su¢ cient supply of local partners.
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demand linkages between the upstream and downstream industries. Yet our
model also di¤ers from theirs in two important aspects: First, we introduce
shared ownership between the MNE and a local partner in the foreign subsidiary,
as investigating the e¤ect of a change in MNE ownership on the productivity
of local rms is the primary focus of this paper. Second, next to pecuniary
spillovers, we also introduce direct and explicit knowledge di¤usion. Moreover,
we disentangle these knowledge di¤usion e¤ects into knowledge spillovers (hor-
izontal) and knowledge transfers (vertical), and consider their contingency on
IPP protection. Further, in the subsequent analysis we do not consider the e¤ect
of MNE entrance or ownership on the entry or exit of local rms, by keeping
the number of rms constant when taking total derivatives (cf. Section 3).
Once again recall that we rst consider part A of Figure 1, where IJV s are
active in the downstream industry (together with local downstream rms d) and
are supplied by local upstream rms u. We model the price index of the inputs
produced by local upstream rms in CES fashion and denote it by:
PU =
 
nup
1 
u
1=(1 )
(1)
where nu are the number of local upstream rms, pu are individual prices of
upstream inputs and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two
input varieties. Suppose for the moment that total demand for inputs from the
downstream sector is given by I. Then, multiplying PU by I gives total costs
of input supply, or equivalently, total expenditures on inputs. Hence, we can
apply Shephards lemma to derive demand for individual inputs xu:
xu = p
 
u IP

U (2)
In the downstream sector we have a similar industry structure, but here both
national rms and IJV s are active. Hence, the price index in the downstream
sector is given by:
PD = (ndp
1 "
d + nIJV p
1 "
IJV )
1=(1 ")
where nd (nIJV ) is the number of local rms (IJV s) active in the downstream
sector, pd (pIJV ) are the prices these rms charge, and " > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties. The volume of total consumer de-
mand for these downstream products is given by Y and total expenditure on
downstream goods is given by Y P D where  is the elasticity of demand with
respect to the price index PD. Similar to Markusen and Venables (1999), we
assume that " > .> 1. Again applying Shephards lemma we obtain individual
demands:
xd = p
 "
d Y P
" 
D (3)
xIJV = p
 "
IJV Y P
" 
D
First consider the prot function of the IJV which is given by:
IJV = pIJV xIJV   (FIJV + IJV xIJV ) [PU + (1  )w] (4)
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where p denotes price, x denotes output, F are xed costs,  are marginal
production costs, w is the wage rate of labor, and  is the share of inputs
sourced from the upstream sector (0    1). Note that the amount of inputs
sourced from the upstream sector depends on the amount of xed costs and
variable costs. The remaining share (1   ) is spent on labor as an additional
production factor.
As mentioned, the IJV is a partnership between a MNE (m) and a local
partner (lp). We assume that the contribution of both rms in terms of technol-
ogy and knowledge to the IJV is proportional to their ownership shares in the
IJV, which is given by  for the MNE and (1  ) for the local partner. These
contributions translate into the xed and marginal production costs of the IJV
and are modelled as follows:
FIJV = Fm + (1  )Fn (5)
IJV = m + (1  )n
where we assume Flp = Fd = Fu  Fn, i.e. xed costs of all national rms are
equal, regardless of their type, and similarly for . In line with earlier literature
(Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999), as well as with the rm characteristics in our
own sample (see Section 5), we assume that Fm < Fn and m < n i.e. the
MNE is more productive than a national rm, both in terms of xed costs as
well as marginal costs. Hence, the larger the ownership share of the MNE in
the IJV , the lower IJV xed and marginal costs will be, which is in line with
the literature on internalization or transaction costs and technology transfer
(Davies, 1992).
A key issue of this paper is the nature and extent of knowledge di¤usion
from the IJV to the national rms. As we already explained, we make an
explicit distinction between unintended knowledge spillovers on the one hand,
and intended knowledge transfer on the other. This distinction is especially
important in the present context, since we conjecture that the type of knowledge
di¤usion is contingent on the direction of di¤usion, i.e. horizontal or vertical.
Specically, we argue that knowledge spillovers from the IJV are most likely
to ow horizontally, i.e. to downstream rms d active in the same sector, for the
IJV has nothing to gain from intentionally transferring knowledge or technology
to its competitors. Moreover, since these rms are active in the same sector,
their absorptive capacity can be expected to be relatively high. Intentional
knowledge transfers on the other hand, are more likely to ow vertically, i.e.
from the IJV to local upstream rms u (in situation A of Figure 1), since the
IJV will benet from this by increased quality or decreased prices of inputs.
Indeed, there exists ample evidence of MNEs that assist their suppliers in terms
of technology transfer, or transfer of best practices or quality standards (Javorcik
and Spatareanu, 2005; Javorcik, 2008).2
In the context of knowledge di¤usion, the extent of IPP also becomes rele-
vant (Branstetter et al., 2006) since the purpose of IPP is to reduce knowledge
2We do not consider explicit learning within the IJV by any of the two parties involved
(for an analysis of this type, see Müller and Schnitzer, 2006).
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spillovers. As a consequence we may expect opposite e¤ects of IPP on (hori-
zontal) knowledge spillovers on the one hand, and (vertical) knowledge transfer
on the other hand: If IPP functions properly, horizontal knowledge spillovers
should be reduced. At the same time however, due to the decreased risk of
expropriation of knowledge, this increases the incentives for the IJV to (verti-
cally) transfer knowledge. Hence, upstream knowledge transfer should increase
with IPP.3
As we have assumed that MNE knowledge transfer to the IJV takes e¤ect
through xed and marginal costs, it is only natural to assume that knowledge
di¤usion from the IJV to downstream and upstream rms will also a¤ect their
xed and marginal cost structures. Hence, for local downstream rms, we model
xed and marginal costs after spillovers as:
FSd = Fd + (1  )FIJV (6)
Sd = d + (1  )IJV
where  is a parameter capturing the strength of Intellectual Property Rights
protection (IPP), with  = 1 denoting perfect protection and  = 0 no protection
whatsoever. Hence, spillovers are maximized when  = 0, implying that the
xed and marginal cost structures of IJV s can be copied perfectly.
For intentional knowledge transfers from the IJV to local upstream rms
we then have:
FTu = (1  )Fu + FIJV (7)
Tu = (1  )u + IJV
Note that because knowledge transfer is intentional (as opposed to spillovers) the
IJV is more willing to transfer its technology as the extent of IPP increases (
increases), since the risk of expropriation is very small in that case (Branstetter
et al., 2006).
The local upstream rm has the following formulation for prots:
u = puxu   (FTu + Tuxu)w (8)
We can derive the equilibrium price for the upstream rm by substituting equi-
librium demand (2) into (8) and maximize prots, which yields:
pu =
Tuw
(   1)
It directly follows from this expression that MNEs benet from technology trans-
fer to upstream rms, since this decreases Tu and hence decreases input prices
pu.
3Apart from the theoretical relevance of introducing IPP in this manner, its opposite e¤ects
on knowledge spillovers and transfers also allow us to test our hypothesized di¤erence between
horizontal and vertical knowledge di¤usion empirically.
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Local downstream rms have the following prot function:
d = pdxd   (FSd + Sdxd)(PU + (1  )w) (9)
the interpretation of which is similar to that of the IJV.4 The equilibrium pricing
condition is found by substituting xd from (3) into (9) and maximizing prots:
pd =
"Sd (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
Note that on top of the knowledge spillovers through Sd , the backward demand
linkage from MNEs to upstream rms poses an additional benet to the lo-
cal downstream rm as it serves to decrease PU as well, which constitutes an
(indirect) forward linkage.
Finally, for the IJV we obtain a similar pricing condition:
pIJV =
"IJV (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
We can now close the model by also writing down derived demand for the
upstream rms products, which is generated by the input demand from the
IJV and the domestic rm in the downstream sector:5
I = nIJV (FIJV + IJV xIJV ) + nd(F
S
d + 
S
dxd) (10)
So far, we have only considered part A of Figure 1, i.e. the situation in
which the IJV is active in the downstream sector generating horizontal intra-
industry e¤ects as well as upstream or backward e¤ects through inter-industry
linkages. In order to analyze downstream or forward linkages, we also consider
the situation in which the IJV is active in the upstream industry (together
with local rms) and supplying local rms in the downstream industry. That
is, part B of Figure 1.6 Because the model remains largely the same, except
4Note that we assume (unlike Markusen and Venables, 1999) that IJV = d = : Al-
though it has been argued that MNEs (or IJV s) will potentially source less of their inputs
in the host-country, we have no way of distinguishing between IJV and d in the empirical
part of the paper, so that we prefer the current specication. However, we will come back
to the implied relationship between  and MNE ownership  when discussing the empirical
results later on.
5Coming back to our earlier remark, we again note that we refrain from deriving free entry
(i.e. zero prot) conditions, but instead assume that these are fullled in both sectors. A
potential problem in this case is that the cost structure of the two rm types in the downstream
sector (IJV s and ds) di¤er. Specically, given that IJV s are more e¢ cient than ds, imposing
a zero-prot condition for ds would imply positive prots for IJV s. In order to prevent this
situation from ocurring, we assume that any resulting positive prots from IJV s are absorbed
by added co-ordination costs between the MNE and its local partner.
6We already noted above that in the model setup discussed so far, we do have indirect
forward linkages to the downstream local rms which are contingent on the upstream linkage,
since they will be a¤ected by changes in PU induced by changes in MNE ownership in the IJV
(). However, in the empirical section, we will also investigate the direct forward linkages, i.e.
the linkage e¤ects of an IJV directly supplying local rms, so that we also have to consider
this case theoretically.
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for the fact that the IJV switches industries, we will not fully write it down
here (Appendix A). However, note that in this case it is the upstream rm that
benets from knowledge spillovers, whereas the downstream rm benets from
knowledge transfer. This also implies that the moderating e¤ects of IPP change
accordingly. In the next section we will analyze the comparative static e¤ects
of a change in MNE ownership in the IJV () on the prots of local rms for
both situations A and B.
3 Intra and inter-industry e¤ects of MNE own-
ership
3.1 IJVs in the downstream sector
Since our main interest in this paper concerns the e¤ects of MNE ownership in
the IJV () on local rms through demand linkages, competition e¤ects and
knowledge di¤usion, we investigate the e¤ect of  on local rms prots. In
order to do this, we compute total derivatives with respect to  while assuming
that all other variables remain unchanged. First consider the e¤ect of MNE
ownership in the downstream industry on upstream rmsprots:
du
d
=
p1 u P

U

BL1|{z}
?0
+
pu

PE1|{z}
<0
+KT1|{z}
>0
(11)
where BL1, PE1 and KT1 are a backward linkage e¤ect, a price e¤ect and a
knowledge transfer e¤ect respectively, the full expressions of which are given in
Appendix B1.
The knowledge transfer e¤ect KT1 is straightforward: An increase in MNE
ownership in the IJV increases explicit knowledge transfer to the upstream rm
by decreasing xed and variable costs, increasing upstream rmsprots. More-
over, the larger the IPP (i.e the larger ), the larger is this positive e¤ect.
The negative upstream price e¤ect PE1is due to our assumption of ho-
mogeneity of rms and their interrelationships, so that all upstream rms are
a¤ected by an increase in  in the same way. Specically, the decrease in Tu
following an increase in  decreases upstream prices pu. This e¤ectively reduces
the price index in the upstream industry PU , i.e. it depresses per rm revenue
in this sector. This e¤ect is stronger the larger is  due to increased knowledge
transfer.
The e¤ect of  through the backward demand linkage (BL1) has three com-
ponents in du=d (see Appendix). First, there is a negative indirect knowledge
spillover e¤ect, which occurs because of the increase in knowledge spillovers to
the local downstream rm as a result of an increase in , making downstream
rms more e¢ cient. This implies less demand for xu since less inputs are needed
to produce the same output. Also note that the negative e¤ect of knowledge
spillovers is moderated by the extent of IPP: The larger , the smaller knowl-
edge spillovers to the local downstream rm and hence, the smaller its negative
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inuence on demand for intermediate inputs. This adds to the positive direct
e¤ect of  through KT1.
Third, there are positive downstream demand e¤ects, induced by the change
in demand for downstream rm products after an increase in . Since xed and
marginal costs of downstream rms are reduced, as well as the fact that input
prices PU go down, prices for downstream products fall, inducing an increase
in demand for downstream products and accordingly also for upstream inputs.
The impact of  on this e¤ect is twofold: On the one hand, an increase in 
decreases knowledge spillovers to local downstream rms, thus limiting the price
decrease of these rms and limiting the increase in derived input demand. On
the other hand, an increase in  raises knowledge transfer to the upstream rm,
lowering input prices and downstream prices, thus increasing derived demand
for inputs again. However, this latter e¤ect is a second order e¤ect, so that in
this case, IPP will most likely exert a negative e¤ect on u.
The third e¤ect which takes place through the backward demand linkage
(BL1) is a downstream price e¤ect. As we will see below as well (when analyzing
dd=d) an increase in  decreases individual prices of all downstream rms,
and thereby also the price index PD. That is to say, an increase in  eventually
decreases per rm revenue in the downstream sector. This in turn has a negative
impact on derived demand for upstream inputs and accordingly on upstream
prots.
We now turn to the national rm in the downstream industry (i.e. the
competitor of the IJV ). Recall that two clear di¤erences with the upstream
rm are that (i) the downstream rm is not vertically linked with the IJV
and (ii) knowledge di¤usion occurs through knowledge spillovers rather than
knowledge transfer. Computing the total derivative of d with respect to 
yields:
dd
d
= ("  )pd
"
xd
PD
PE2|{z}
<0
+KS1|{z}
>0
+ IDL1| {z }
>0
(12)
where PE2, KS1 and IDL1 are a price e¤ect, a knowledge spillover e¤ect,
and an indirect demand linkage e¤ect respectively (the explicit expressions are
relegated to Appendix B2).
First, the price e¤ect (PE2) works through the price index PD. Due to the
increase in , IJV cost structures improve because of increased intra-rm knowl-
edge transfer, making IJV s more competitive. Moreover, since the increase in
 also increases horizontal knowledge spillovers, contingent on the lack of IPP
(1  ), each individual national rm in the downstream industry is confronted
with a decrease in PD, a decrease in per rm revenue, and hence a decrease in
prots.
Second, there is the direct knowledge spillover e¤ect (KS1), occurring through
the xed and marginal cost structure and again contingent on the absence of
IPP protection (1  ). This e¤ect is obviously positive.
Finally, the downstream national rm also prots from the vertical link-
age between the IJV s and the upstream rms, albeit in an indirect way via
PU (IDL1). Indeed, since backward knowledge transfer from the IJV to the
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upstream rm increases with  (see above), national downstream rms are con-
fronted with lower input prices PU . The extent of this positive indirect linkage
is contingent on the input share  as well as on the extent of IPP . Regarding
the latter, this poses a counter-acting force to the direct knowledge spillovers
from the IJV to the downstream rm: To benet more from these spillovers,
the downstream rm requires a lower  (rst-order), but to benet from lower
input prices, it requires a higher  (second-order).
3.2 IJVs in the upstream sector
Now we will consider the situation in which the IJV s (and local rms) are active
in the upstream sector, hence supplying local rms in the downstream sector
(situation B in Figure 1). The analysis is similar to the one before, but recall
that in this situation the local upstream rms benet from knowledge di¤u-
sion through knowledge spillovers, whereas the downstream rms receive MNE
knowledge through knowledge transfer. First consider the e¤ect of an increase
in  on local upstream rmsprots (the explicit formulations are relegated to
Appendix B3):
du
d
=
pu

(IDL2| {z }
<0
+ PE3|{z}
<0
) +KS2|{z}
>0
(13)
As before, there are three e¤ects: An indirect demand linkage e¤ect (IDL2), a
price e¤ect (PE3) and a knowledge spillover e¤ect (KS2). First, the indirect
demand linkage takes e¤ect as a result of an increase in knowledge transfer
from the IJV to the local downstream rms. As they become more e¢ cient, the
derived input demand decreases, lowering upstream rmsprots. Moreover, the
higher IPP (i.e. the higher ), the more knowledge is transferred downstream
and the larger the negative e¤ect on u. Second, as similar as before, the
price e¤ect occurs because knowledge spillovers to local upstream rms and
knowledge transfer by the MNE to the IJV a¤ect all rms in the upstream
sector simultaneously. This lowers the price index PU and thus also per rm
revenue. Moreover, the extent to which knowledge spillovers add to this e¤ect
is larger the lower . Third, the knowledge spillover e¤ect obviously increases
upstream prots, and this e¤ect becomes stronger the lower is .
Finally, for local downstream rms we now have (the explicit formulations
are relegated to Appendix B4):
dd
d
= PE4|{z}
<0
+KT2|{z}
>0
+ FL1|{z}
>0
(14)
We can distinguish a price e¤ect (PE4), a knowledge transfer e¤ect (KT2) and
a forward linkage e¤ect (FL1). The negative price e¤ect occurs because all
downstream rms are similarly a¤ected by knowledge transfer and decreased
input prices. That is, they all become more productive and charge lower prices,
thus decreasing per rm revenue. Note that  has an ambiguous e¤ect on this
mechanism: On the one hand, it magnies the negative e¤ect through increased
11
knowledge transfer, but on the other hand it reduces it through decreased knowl-
edge spillovers to upstream rms (and hence, a smaller decrease in input prices).
The knowledge transfer e¤ect obviously increases downstream rm prots, and
the more so the higher is . Finally, the forward linkage e¤ect occurs because
knowledge spillovers from the IJV to local upstream rms, as well as knowledge
transfer from the MNE to the IJV , decrease input prices for downstream rms,
thus increasing their prots. In this case, an increase in  has an unambiguously
negative e¤ect, as it serves to decrease knowledge spillovers.
3.3 Signing the e¤ects
All total derivatives derived contain e¤ects that are opposite in sign. Moreover,
as can be seen from the expressions in the Appendix, deriving conditions under
which their sign is unambiguous is not straightforward for most of these deriv-
atives. A lot of this ambiguity is caused by the often opposing e¤ects of IPP
(). Indeed, as it turns out, many of the expressions simplify substantially when
considering the extreme cases, i.e. when  = 0 or  = 1. In Table 1 below we
summarize the signs of the total derivatives, also considering the cases in which
 = f0; 1g. The derivations can be found in the Appendix.
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>
First consider the e¤ects through backward linkages, i.e. du=d with MNEs
downstream. When  is variable or when  = 0, the e¤ect of a change in  on
upstream prots is indeterminate in (11). However, given that the conditions
in Table 1 are met, the e¤ect is unambiguously positive for  = 1. Obviously,
 = 1 indicates perfect IPP and upstream knowledge transfer by the MNE is
at its maximum, ceteris paribus maximizing the positive e¤ect of KT1 in (11).
Moreover, the condition implies that the positive e¤ect is more likely (i) the
smaller are total variable costs relative tot total xed costs in the downstream
industry (the LHS of the condition), (ii) the larger is  and (iii) the larger is .
The latter e¤ect is caused by the fact that a higher  - implying a more price-
sensitive downstream demand - translates the downstream price decrease (due to
a decrease in PU following increased knowledge transfer) into higher downstream
demand, and thus also higher derived demand for upstream intermediates. This
e¤ect in turn is larger, the larger is the intermediate input share of downstream
rms . The rst e¤ect occurs through the backward demand linkage BL1:
Since downstream xed costs are only a¤ected through knowledge spillovers,
whereas marginal costs both through knowledge spillovers and price e¤ects, the
total negative e¤ect on upstream rms of these combined e¤ects will be lower,
the smaller are variable costs relative to xed costs.
Next consider the e¤ects through forward linkages, i.e. dd=d with MNEs
upstream. The table shows that in all cases, " > 2 is a su¢ cient condition for this
derivative to be positive. The reason for this is that although the negative price
e¤ect PE4 in (14) becomes more severe when downstream products become
better substitutes (i.e. when " is higher), at the same time also the positive
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impact of both KT2 and FL1 are more pronounced; the resulting downstream
price decreases that follow from them have a larger impact on rm prots when
" is higher. These two positive e¤ects consistently outweigh the negative e¤ect
of PE4 when " > 2.
Finally, in order to consider the intra-industry e¤ects of a change in , we
have to consider both dd=d with MNEs downstream, as well as du=d with
MNEs upstream, for in practice MNEs will simultaneously serve as downstream
(customer) rms for some local companies, and as upstream (supplier) rms for
others. First consider dd=d with MNEs downstream: We see that in both
the extreme cases ( = 0; 1) its sign is unambiguously positive. The reason is
that in both cases, one of either two positive e¤ects in (12) is maximized, which
more then compensates the remaining negative e¤ect of PE2. Specically, when
 = 0, KS1 is maximized and when  = 1, IDL1 is maximized. For du=d
with MNEs upstream, we see a conditional positive e¤ect when  = 0 and an
unconditional negative e¤ect when  = 1. The latter is obvious: If  = 1, KS2
in (13) is zero, so that only the negative e¤ects of IDL2 and PE3 remain. When
 = 0, the negative e¤ect of IDL2 disappears and the e¤ect ofKS2 is maximized.
The condition states that the larger xed costs are relative to marginal costs
(or more precisely: the more important the e¤ect of knowledge di¤usion on
xed rather than marginal costs) the more likely it is that du=d > 0. The
reason is that the negative price e¤ect PE1 only works through marginal costs,
whereas the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect KS2 works both through xed
and marginal costs. Taken together, these e¤ects imply that horizontal (intra-
industry) e¤ects of increasing  are positive if  = 0 and xed costs are large
relative to marginal costs, whereas they are ambiguous if  = 1.
In the remainder of this paper we will empirically explore these insights re-
garding the horizontal and vertical e¤ects of MNE ownership on local rms.
Moreover, the cross-country nature of our rm panel also allows us the empiri-
cally investigate the derived e¤ects of di¤erences in IPP.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Methodology
Although our theoretical model derives predictions regarding the relationship
between rm prots and MNE ownership, the extant literature on knowledge
di¤usion from FDI usually considers the e¤ect of MNE presence on local rms
productivity. In order to enhance comparability of our results, we also follow
this approach in the empirical section of the paper. Moreover, from the prot
functions in Section 2 it is clear that there exists a positive and proportional
relationship between rm productivity and rm prots.
The empirical model that we will estimate takes the following generic form:
!ijkt = 0 + 1Horizontaljkt + 2Backwardjkt + 3Forwardjkt (15)
+4Xit +Dj +Dk + "ijkt
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where i, j, k and t index rm, industry, country and time (year) respectively,
! is rm level productivity, Horizontal is a measure of intra-industry MNE
presence, Backward (Forward) is a measure of MNE presence in customer
or downstream (supplier or upstream) industries, X is a vector of rm level
control variables, Dj and Dk are two sets of industry and country dummies,
" is an error term which is clustered at the industry level and assumed to be
normally distributed, and the s are the parameters to be estimated. The
precise measurement of these variables is explained below.
A well-known problem with empirical models such as the one in (15) is the
measurement of the dependent variable. Productivity is usually computed as
the error term of a production function. However, to the extent that (expected)
changes in productivity are observed or anticipated by rmsmanagers, the
requirement of independence between the error term and the independent vari-
ables is violated, since managers may adjust variable inputs and production
factors (such as labor) in anticipation of productivity changes.
Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest a robust estimator to tackle this issue. The
underlying idea is that there exists a relationship between unobserved produc-
tivity on the one hand, and observable investment and capital on the other hand.
Using this relationship, one can control for productivity in the production func-
tion estimation, by adding the function of investment and capital in addition to
labor and capital (and material) inputs.7 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extend
this approach to situations in which there are a lot of zero observations on rm
level investment, in which case it is not possible to invert the investment func-
tion, and hence to derive the productivity function. Since virtually all of our
rms have positive observations on investment, we will use the Olley and Pakes
(1996) procedure to estimate productivity.8
One important additional issue we need to tackle is the fact that our theo-
retical model does not suggest a clear functional form regarding the relationship
between MNE ownership in its subsidiary and local rm prots (and produc-
tivity). This can be noted from the expressions of the total derivatives (cf.
Appendix), which themselves are polynomial functions of MNE ownership .
Moreover, the degree of the polynomial in  depends on the elasticities of sub-
stitution and demand. A second issue in this regard is that some parameters in
our model may be functions of  themselves, such as the di¤erent elasticities of
substitution or the input and output shares, which further induces the di¤erent
total derivatives to be (polynomial) functions of . Hence it would be inappro-
priate to specify a functional form empirically ex ante. Fortunately, we can use
(semiparametric) partial linear regression analysis to get a clue regarding the
proper empirical specication.
Specically, the generic partial linear regression model in our case takes the
7Since the appropriate functional form of the function of investment and capital is not
known, Olley and Pakes (1996) use a third-order polynomial expansion in both variables to
proxy the function. We follow this procedure in our production function estimation.
8 In order to empirically implement the estimator, we use a programme developed by Arnold
(2003).
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following form:
yi = g(zj) + Xi + ij (16)
where i and j again index rm and industry respectively, g(z) is the nonpara-
metric component of the model for which the functional form is determined
using a Kernel estimator, X is a vector of (rm level) variables that enter the
model in the usual parametric fashion, and  is an error term. In the context
of the present paper, the variables measuring MNE presence would enter the
non-parametric component, whereas the control variables enter the parametric
component.
The model in (16) can be estimated by using a di¤erence estimator (Robin-
son, 1988). Lokshin (2006) proposes the following estimator of the model, based
on Yatchew (1997):
mX
j 1
djyi j =
mX
j 1
djg(zi j) + 
0@ mX
j 1
djxi j
1A+ mX
j 1
dji j (17)
where m is the order of di¤erencing and the ds are the di¤erencing weights.9
When optimal weights d are chosen, OLS estimation can be consistently applied
to (17) in order to obtain estimates for the parametric part of the model. If
we denote the resulting estimator by ^diff we can retrieve the nonparametric
component in (16) as follows:
yi   ^diffxi = g (zj) + (   ^diff )Xi + "i ' g(zj) + i
We can then use a nonparametric estimator to estimate the nonparametric com-
ponent g(zj). Here we again follow Lokshin (2006) who proposes the use of a
Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoother (lowess). Lowess belongs to the class
of Nearest Neighbours Estimators: It estimates local polynomials to derive a
functional form for g(:), based on the distribution of the observations in a zy-
scatterplot. The local polynomial estimation is repeated over small parts of the
distribution, where the partitioning (in so-called bandwidths) is variable. This
results in a smoothed t of the relationship between z and y, which can be
depicted in zy space.
Finally, we need a way to determine whether or not the nonparametric com-
ponent in (16) makes a signicant contribution to the model. Obviously, since
we are not estimating any parameter values, we cannot use regular test statistics
to determine signicance. Instead, Lokshin (2006) proposed the following test
statistic:
V =
p
mN(s2res   s2diff )=s2diff  N(0; 1) (18)
where s2res is the mean square residual of the parametric regression and s
2
diff the
squared residual of the semi-parametric regression. Hence, if this test statistic
9These weights have to satisfy two conditions: (i)
Pm
j 1 dj = 0 , which assusres that the
nonparametric component in (16) is removed, and (ii)
Pm
j 1 d
2
j = 1 which assures that the
residuals in (16) have variance 2 .
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surpasses the standard normal critical values at usual signicance levels, we
can conclude that the nonparametric component contributes signicantly to the
model in (16).
Despite the attractive property of not having to specify an explicit functional
form between productivity e¤ects and MNE ownership, there are some other
caveats of partial linear regression analysis. The most important of these is that
the method of Lokshin (2006) is only applicable to cross-section samples, so that
we loose a lot of information contained in the time-series dimension of the data.
The second drawback is that this method does not allow for clustering of the
error term, which is problematic when estimating rm-level productivity e¤ects
while using rm and sector level explanatory variables. Third, because of the
need for a fairly large sample to consistently estimate the partial linear model
(the so-called curse of dimensionality in semiparametric and non-parametric
regression analysis), it is unwarranted to split up the sample according to IPP
levels, as this would heavily reduce the size of the resulting subsamples. Because
of these drawbacks, we use the semiparametric approach mainly for exploratory
purposes, and revert to a more standard parametric specication to tackle these
three issues.
Summarizing, in order to obtain a proper estimate of our dependent vari-
able in model (15) we use the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure. Moreover,
since we have no clear theoretical indications regarding the proper functional
form of the relationship between rm productivity and MNE ownership, we use
semiparametric regression analysis to nd the best parametric specication for
this relationship. We will then take the functional forms suggested by the par-
tial linear regression models and impose it in a standard parametric regression
model like the one in (15).
4.2 Data
Our sample contains a short panel of 1549 large, publicly traded rms that are
active in 20 countries and 18 sectors during the period 2000-2005. Of these
rms, 327 are partly owned by an MNE. In order to obtain the production
function parameters with the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure, we estimated
production functions at the two-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. A full list of countries
and sectors is included in the Appendix.
Our main variable of interest, i.e. the extent of intra-industry MNE presence,
is computed as follows (cf. Javorcik, 2004):
Horizontaljt =
Pnj
i=1(i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (19)
where nj is the number of foreign-owned subsidiaries present in sector j, Nj
is the total number of rms in sector j, i is the share of MNE ownership in
the subsidiaries, and Salesi are the amount of rm-level sales. As with most
empirical studies using MNE ownership, we only have observations for  in one
year (2004), which we also use to compute Horizontal in the other years.
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In line with Javorcik (2004), we use input and output shares (constructed
from OECD I-O tables) to compute forward and backward linkages.10 Speci-
cally, if jk denotes the output share of sector j owing to sector k (with j 6= k)
backward linkages are computed as:
Backwardjt =
X
k 6=j
(jk Horizontalkt) (20)
where Horizontalk is dened as in (19). Hence, in line with the theoretical
model developed in Section 2, the extent of backward linkages is proxied by the
amount of inter-industry sales from industry j to k.
Forward linkages are computed in an analogous manner:
Forwardjt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontalkt) (21)
where jk is the share of inputs that sector j obtains from sector k. Javor-
cik (2004) nets out exports from the host country to other countries from
Hoirzontalkt in this case,.since such exports are obviously not destined for local
sector j. However, due to lack of data we are not able to follow this approach,
and have to settle with the computation in (21).
As explained in the previous section, our dependent variable is the produc-
tivity of local rms, computed using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology,
and using data on net sales and revenue, employment, net xed capital stocks
and total investment for the years 2000-2005.
We add two control variables: First, we use a measure of rm size, measured
by (the log of) total assets of the rm. The expected sign of this variable is
unclear: Some authors have argued that large rms are conducive to innovation
and hence productivity, because of economies of scale (Cohen and Klepper,
1996). Yet others argue that resources are not easily and e¢ ciently allocated
in large rms, hence wasting productive resources and decreasing productivity
(Acs and Audretsch, 1990). The sign of this variable is thus an empirical matter.
Second, in order to also incorporate a relative measure of rm size, we use the
share of rm-sales in total industry-sales (i.e. market share) as an additional
control variable. Again, the sign of this variable is not clear ex-ante. Table 2
below presents some summary statistics and pairwise correlations between the
variables.
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>
We also have to construct variables that enable us to test the conditions in
Table 1. For this purpose, we follow earlier research (Javorcik, 2004b; Allred
and Park, 2007) and use the Ginarte and Park (1997) dataset containing data
on the strength of national IPP systems .11 The most recent set of observations
10Although our data pertain to the period 2000-2005, the most recent I-O tables available
are from 2002, so that we use these data to compute input-output shares for the entire period.
11We thank professor Park for sharing the updated dataset.
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relate to the year 2000, which are the ones we have used in the empirical part
of the paper. The IPP index is made up out of ve di¤erent components, all
rated on a 0 to 1 scale (cf. Ginarte and Park, 1996 for a detailed description of
this index). Taken together, the IPP index is measured along a 5 point scale,
where a value of 0 indicates very weak IPP and 5 indicates very strong IPP.
Regarding the horizontal productivity e¤ects, we noted that they are more
likely to be positive under  = 0 when xed costs make up a relative large share
of total costs (i.e. xed and variable costs). We use data on net xed assets F
(property, plant and equipment) to capture rm-level xed costs, and data on
salaries and benet expenses L to capture variable costs. We then construct a
variable (F + L)=L which corresponds with the condition in Table 1.
For forward productivity e¤ects (dd=d with MNEs upstream) we estab-
lished that if the elasticity of substitution " between upstream products is
large enough, this e¤ect will be positive. If we interpret " as a measure of
upstream competition (with higher " indicating more substitution and hence
more competition) we can construct a Herndahl index to measure the inverse
of ". Hence, for each country-industry-year combination in our sample, we con-
struct a Herndahl index which captures all our sample-rms which belong to
a particular sector.
Finally, the condition regarding backward productivity e¤ects (du=d with
MNEs downstream) depends inter alia on  and .  is already incorporated
in the computation of (20). Since we do not have the data to compute proper
estimates of , we will just focus on  in the empirical part of the paper.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Semiparametric results
Before turning to the regression results, we rst briey consider the productiv-
ity di¤erence between local rms and IJV s, since the presumed productivity
superiority of MNEs and hence IJV s vis-à-vis local rms lies at the heart of our
model, and as such at the hart of the knowledge di¤usion process. Comparing
the log of productivity levels of the 327 IJV s in our sample versus the 1222 local
rms, the former have an average productivity of 5.80 and the latter 5.02. A
paired t-test strongly rejects the equality of these two means (t = 14:3). Hence,
the superiority of IJV s with respect to local rms on productivity as assumed
in our theoretical model is conrmed in our sample.
First we consider the results of the semiparametric partial linear regression
model. We will investigate the e¤ect of the three di¤erent MNE presence vari-
ables separately, in order to obtain the empirical functional relationship between
productivity and the relevant MNE ownership share. As explained in the pre-
vious section, the partial linear regression estimator we use is only applicable in
cross-sections. Thus all results reported in this subsection pertain to the year
2004, which is the year in which the MNE ownership shares were observed. The
results of the partial linear regression model are reported in Table 3 below. Fig-
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ure 2 contains the resulting non-parametric relationship between productivity
and each of the MNE presence variables.
The rst column in Table 3 adds the horizontal variable from (19) to the
non-parametric component of the model. As indicated by the test statistic V
from (18), the non-parametric component enters the model highly signicantly.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 depicts the implied relationship. We nd that an increase
in MNE ownership in the IJV increases local rmsproductivity. However, it
is also clear that this relationship is not linear, but characterized by decreasing
returns to MNE ownership at low levels of MNE ownership, and increasing
returns to MNE ownership at high levels. Hence, the semiparametric model
suggests a cubic relationship between intra-industry MNE ownership and local
rmsproductivity.
<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >>
In the second column we put the backward variable from (20) in the non-
parametric component. The test statistic V again indicates that the non-
parametric component enters the model highly signicantly, and panel (b) in
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the downstream MNE ownership share
and upstream local rmsproductivity. The gure demonstrates a quadratic re-
lationship, although the 95% condence interval around this relationship is quite
large.
Finally, in column three of Table 3 we put the forward variable from (21)
in the non-parametric component of the model. Forward spillovers enter the
model highly signicantly and from panel (c) in Figure 2 we see that the re-
lationship between upstream MNE ownership and downstream productivity of
local customers is again characterized by a quadratic relationship. But also in
this case, the 95% condence interval is rather wide.
Both rm size and market share are signicant and positive, indicating that
both absolute rm size as well as rm size relative to the market are conducive
to productivity. In terms of model t, the models perform rather well, indicat-
ing that the industry and country xed e¤ects also absorb a lot of the variation
in rm productivity. However, in order to tackle the three problems described
in the previous section, we have to revert to parametric regression analysis. In
doing so, we can use the outcomes of the semiparametric models as guide regard-
ing the parametric model specication. Specically, the semiparametric results
suggest that we need quadratic and cubic specications to capture the relation-
ship between rm productivity and MNE ownership. Hence, we construct two
new variables:
Horizontal2jt =
Pnj
i=1(
2
i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (22)
Horizontal3jt =
Pnj
i=1(
3
i  Salesit)PNj
i=1 Salesit
s.t. 0  i < 1 (23)
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These two variables - in combination with Horizontal from (19) - should be able
to capture the intra-industry productivity e¤ects in a parametric setup. Using
these, we can also construct two additional variables to parametrically proxy
the quadratic relationship between downstream (upstream) MNE ownership and
upstream (downstream) productivity:
Backward2jt =
X
k 6=j
(jk Horizontal2kt) (24)
Forward2jt =
X
j 6=k
(jk Horizontal2kt) (25)
5.2 Parametric results
Table 4 below species parametric regression models, including all three di¤u-
sion variables, as well as the two control variables, while exploiting both the
cross-section and the time variation of the data and splitting up the sample in
high and low IPP countries in columns (2) and (3). The standard errors are
robust and have been allowed to cluster at the industry level.
The results for the total sample in the parametric model are reported in
column (1) and are rather di¤erent from the semiparametric results. Regarding
the horizontal productivity e¤ects, instead of a cubic relationship we actually
observe a squared relationship. Specically, there appear to be decreasing re-
turns to MNE ownership, as depicted in panel a of Figure 3:12 After an initial
increase in intra-industry productivity e¤ects following an increase in , the
relationship becomes negative around 30% of MNE ownership. Regarding the
backward and forward e¤ects, none of them are signicant.
<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >>
We proceed by splitting up the sample in two groups: Those with a relatively
high IPP index and those with a relatively low IPP index. We use the median
IPP level in the total sample as the cuto¤ point: This level is 4.19.13 Column
2 in Table 4 presents the result for the low-IPP sample. In contrast to the
total sample results in column (1), we now observe a cubic relationship between
MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity e¤ects. As shown in panel b
of Figure 3, between 0%-20% of MNE ownership there is a positive relationship
12All the panels in Figure 3 are constructed with generic formulas y = (ax+ bx2 + cx3)  z,
where y is producitivity, x is MNE ownership (between 0 and 100) and z is the mean value of
either Horizontal, Backward or Forward, computed without correcting for MNE ownership
shares (these are 0.1, 0.01 and 0.03 respectively). The coe¢ cients a, b and (if applicable) c
are the coe¢ cient estimates from Table 4.
13Note that this median value pertains to the country-level rather than the industry or
rm-level, so that the number of (rm-year) observations is not equally split between the two
groups. Admittedly, a median value of 4.19 is rather high, which is caused by the fact that
we have mainly high-developed countries in our sample. Also, it implies that the variation
in IPP is much higer in the low-IPP sample (from 2.9 to 4.19)) than in the high-IPP sample
(from 4.19 to 5).
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with intra-industry productivity e¤ects, but this becomes negative after 20%.
The subsequent decline in total productivity is larger than in the total sample.
The minimum in this relationship is beyond the relevant domain (0%-100%).
As before, both the backward and forward e¤ects are insignicant.
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE >>
Column (3) in the table repeats this model for the high-IPP countries. The
horizontal productivity e¤ects change back to a quadratic form, with the turning
point from a positive to a negative relationship at 55% (panel c of Figure 3).
We now also observe signicant backward productivity e¤ects, for which there
appear to be decreasing returns to MNE ownership as well. As shown in panel
d of Figure 3, the turning point of the relationship lies around 50%. Also note
that the backward e¤ect is similar in magnitude as the horizontal e¤ect.
Both control variables are signicant as in the semiparametric regressions.
Firm size is consistently positive, indicating that larger rms are more pro-
ductive, and market share is consistently positive as well, indicating that large
rm size relative to market size is generally also conducive to rm productivity.
Regarding model t, all three models perform rather well with R2s around 80%.
In Table 5 we repeat these regressions, now taking into account the condi-
tions derived in Table 1. Specically, for all three regressions we interact the
forward variable with a Herndahl index. Additionally, in the low IPP sample
we interact the horizontal variable with our (F + L)=L variable. As mentioned
before, the e¤ect of  on the backward variable is already included by construc-
tion.
Column (1) shows that the horizontal productivity e¤ects are virtually simi-
lar as in column (1) of Table 4. However, we now also observe signicant e¤ects
of our forward variable, interacted with the Herndahl index. Panel a of Figure
4 shows the individual forward productivity e¤ect: The relationship is positive
up to 50% of MNE ownership and then becomes negative. Panel b depicts the
interacted relationship, where we have taken the extreme case (i.e. a Herndahl
index of 1). As can be seen, the e¤ects are almost reversed now, with a negative
relationship up to 40% of MNE ownership.
<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>
In column (2) we also interact the horizontal variable with (F +L)=L. Both
the individual and interacted e¤ects are highly signicant. Panel c in Figure 4
shows the individual e¤ects, which di¤er heavily from those in panel b of Figure
3. In this case, the relationship is positive for MNE ownership below 30% and
above 60%, and negative in between. In stark contrast, the interacted e¤ects
shown in panel d of Figure 4 demonstrate a consistently negative relationship
between MNE ownership and intra-industry productivity.14 Regarding the
forward e¤ects, we now only observe a signicant e¤ect of the interaction terms.
The e¤ects are similar to those in panel b of Figure 4, although the turning
point now lies around 50%.
14The variable (F + L)=L was evaluated at its mean of 14 when constructing the graph.
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<< INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE >>
Finally, column (3) repeats the model in column (1) for the high IPP sample.
In contrast to Table 4, there now is a cubic relationship between MNE ownership
and intra-industry productivity, shown in panel e of Figure 4. The relationship
is now positive over the entire domain, with decreasing returns to  up until
70%, after which there are increasing returns. As before, backward productivity
e¤ects are signicant, showing a similar pattern as in panel c of Figure 3. The
individual forward productivity e¤ect is now linear and positive, whereas the
interaction e¤ect shows a e¤ect similar to panel b in Figure 4, with the turning
point at 20%.
As before, the control variables are both positive and signicant throughout
all the regressions, and with R2s of around 80% the models perform well.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have theoretically and empirically investigated the relationship
between horizontal and vertical productivity e¤ects from MNEs with varying de-
grees of foreign ownership to local (host-country) rms. Theoretically, we have
established the ambiguity in this relationship due to the simultaneous inter-
play of (sometimes) opposing knowledge di¤usion, price and direct and indirect
demand and supply linkage e¤ects, and the mediating e¤ect of intellectual prop-
erty right protection (IPP). We have also distinguished between unintentional
knowledge spillovers and intentional knowledge transfers, where we argue the
former mainly occur intra-industry, whereas the latter dominate inter-industry
knowledge di¤usion. Eventually we derived a number of conditions under which
some of the ambiguous productivity e¤ects are more likely to be positive or
negative.
We then empirically investigate the relationship between horizontal and ver-
tical MNE ownership in foreign a¢ liates and local rmsproductivity, using a
panel of 1904 local rms and 327 MNEs in 20 countries and 18 industries during
the period 2000-2005. We utilize both semiparametric partial linear regression
analysis for exploratory purposes, as well as standard parametric panel data
techniques.
Regarding horizontal (intra-industry) productivity e¤ects, we initially nd
that there are decreasing returns to MNE ownership. I.e. although productivity
e¤ects rst increase with MNE ownership, at some point the relationship be-
comes negative. From our theoretical model, we can derive that for low degrees
of MNE ownership, the positive knowledge spillover and indirect upstream de-
mand linkages dominate, whereas for increased degrees of MNE ownership, the
negative price e¤ect and indirect downstream demand linkages dominate. One
implication is that increased MNE ownership a¤ects input and output shares
asymmetrically: It appears that local input demand decreases faster with in-
creased MNE ownership than local output supply, which may cause the shift
from positive upstream to negative downstream linkages. Moreover, we observe
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that the relationship between rm productivity and MNE ownership occurs at
higher degrees of MNE ownership in high-IPP systems relative to low-IPP sys-
tems. This may be a reection of the fact that MNE owners feel more secure in
transferring knowledge upstream in high-IPP systems than in low-IPP systems,
as we already conjectured in our theoretical setup.
However, these results change quite a bit when we consider the interaction
e¤ect between our measure of horizontal foreign presence and the inverse share
of variable costs in total costs of local rms. Our theoretical model predicts
that in low-IPP systems, an increase in this inverse share should increase the
likelihood of positive productivity e¤ects. The reason for this is that the neg-
ative price e¤ect in our model only works through marginal costs, whereas the
positive knowledge spillover e¤ect works both through xed and marginal costs.
However, our empirical results reach exactly the opposite conclusion: For higher
inverse shares (indicating a larger share of xed costs in total costs), the produc-
tivity e¤ects from increased MNE ownership are actually negative, whereas for
lower inverse shares they are largely positive. The implication is that positive
knowledge spillover (and upstream indirect demand linkage) e¤ects work more
through marginal or variables costs than through xed costs. The fact that our
model predicts exactly the opposite is due both to an assumption (i.e. that
both xed and marginal costs are a¤ected equally by knowledge spillovers and
transfers) as well as the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setup (which
makes prices a function of marginal costs only). Our empirical results indicate
that these modelling artifacts may be at odds with reality.
Regarding backward productivity e¤ects, our theoretical model demonstrates
opposing positive e¤ects of upstream knowledge transfer, and negative e¤ects of
upstream price e¤ects. Additionally, there is an ambiguous e¤ect of backward
linkages. We also nd that at least in high-IPP countries, an increase in the
input share will increase the likelihood of a positive e¤ect, as it serves to make
the backward linkages positive and hence tilt the balance in favor of the positive
e¤ects. Our empirical results are very consistent with this prediction. Indeed,
in none of the total sample or low-IPP sample results do we nd signicant
backward productivity e¤ects, indicating the theoretical ambiguity. However,
in the high-IPP samples we nd a consistently signicant e¤ect. Moreover, we
again nd decreasing returns to MNE ownership, with a positive relationship
only for relatively low degrees of MNE ownership. If we link this result with the
literature on international input sourcing by MNEs (Taveres and Young, 2006),
this result is very consistent with our theoretical predictions: According to this
literature, increased MNE ownership increases the extent to which a subsidiary
sources its inputs internationally instead of locally, hence decreasing the (local)
input share. According to our model, this would eventually induce a negative re-
lationship between MNE ownership and backward productivity e¤ects for larger
degrees of MNE ownership, which is exactly what we observe.
Finally, our model indicates that in all cases, forward productivity e¤ects
will only take e¤ect if there is a su¢ cient degree of downstream competition, the
reason being that in that case positive forward linkages and knowledge transfer
e¤ects outweigh negative demand e¤ects. Indeed, when we just consider for-
23
ward productivity e¤ects separately (i.e. without simultaneously considering
downstream competition) we nd no e¤ects whatsoever. Only after interacting
this e¤ect with a Herndahl index of downstream competition do we nd consis-
tently signicant e¤ects. The positive relationship between MNE ownership and
forward productivity e¤ects in a highly competitive context is most pronounced
in the high-IPP sample, where the e¤ect is positive and linear. In the low-IPP
sample there essentially is no e¤ect in this case, whereas the relationship in
the total sample is quadratic, reaching an optimum around 50%. These results
are thus partly in accordance with our theory. Regarding the e¤ects in low-
competitive environments, we indeed nd a negative relationship between MNE
ownership and forward productivity e¤ects for low degrees of MNE ownership.
Nonetheless, for a large range of MNE ownership degrees, the relationship is
positive, contrary to what our model predicts. There are two possible expla-
nations for this: The rst is that there exists a relationship between upstream
MNE ownership and downstream competition, which we have not modelled,
but which does not seem unlikely. Second, the derived conditions are su¢ cient
conditions, but not necessary, so that the empirical results may be picking up
something else.
So what does all of this imply for the e¤ectiveness and usefulness of well-
developed IPP policy? One thing that both our model and our empirical results
suggest, is that a strong IPP system stimulates the intentional inter-industry
transfer of knowledge from MNEs to local rms, the extent of which depends
on the amount of MNE ownership. Indeed, only in the high IPP samples do
we nd signicant and positive e¤ects of backward productivity e¤ects for low
degrees of MNE ownership. Also for forward productivity e¤ects, we nd a
positive relationship with MNE ownership in the high-IPP sample, given that
downstream competition is su¢ cient. Even for horizontal productivity e¤ects,
we nd an unconditional positive relationship with MNE ownership in high-IPP
countries, which is again probably due to the increased willingness of intentional
inter-industry knowledge transfer, inducing positive indirect demand linkage
e¤ects (although we cannot separate these empirically). In sum, it seems that
developing well-functioning IPP regulations is only to the benet of the country
involved: Even though rms (with a relatively large share of variable costs
in total costs) in low-IPP countries may also benet from positive horizontal
productivity e¤ects, the positive inter-industry e¤ects are largely absent.
Finally, this study is characterized by some limitations, the most impor-
tant of which is the fact that our sample only consists of large and publicly
traded rms. As such, the results of this study cannot be readily general-
ized beyond the specic characteristics of our sample, and moreover, a direct
comparison to most of the earlier empirical one-country studies is not possible
either. However, a trade-o¤ exists between encompassing multiple countries in
the analysis, versus increasing the rm-sample beyond only the largest rms,
which inhibits investigating country-level e¤ects on the knowledge spillover or
transfer process. Another limitation is the fact that our sample mainly contains
developed countries, which mainly translates into a limited variation on our IPP
variable. Increasing the sample to include also (large and traded) rms from less
24
developed countries and emerging markets would be a valuable extension of this
study, again specically with regard to investigating country-level determinants
or moderators of the knowledge di¤usion process.
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Appendix A
Here we consider the case in which the IJV (and its local competitors) are active
in the upstream industries, supplying other local rms in downstream industries.
That is, we now consider part B of Figure 1. This allows us to investigate
the direct e¤ect of demand and supply e¤ects and knowledge di¤usion through
forward linkages (rather than indirectly, via backward linkages).
The analysis is very similar to the one in the main text considering part A
of Figure 1. The upstream industry price index is now given by:
PU = (nup
1 
u + nIJV p
1 
IJV )
1=(1 )
As before, demand for intermediate products (which will be derived below) is
denoted by I so that applying Sheppards lemma yields demand for individual
upstream rmsproducts:
xu = p
 
u IP

U
xIJV = p
 
IJV IP

U
Prot functions for upstream rms are given by:
u = puxu   (FSu + Suxu)w
IJV = pIJV xIJV   (FIJV + IJV xIJV )w
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In this case, the upstream rm benets from MNE knowledge di¤usion through
spillovers rather than transfers, since it is a direct competitor of the IJV. Sub-
stituting the individual demands and maximizing prots yields the equilibrium
pricing conditions:
pu =
Suw
(   1)
pIJV =
IJV w
(   1)
In the downstream, the price index is given by:
PD = (ndp
1 "
d )
1=(1 ")
As before, total demand for downstream products is denoted by Y P D so that
we can derive demand for individual downstream products:
xd = p
 "
d Y P
" 
D
Downstream rm prots are expressed as:
d = pdxd   (FTd + Td xd)(Pu + (1  )w)
where  is the share of inputs that the downstream rm obtains from the
upstream rms. Again note that in this case, the downstream rm benets
from knowledge di¤usion through knowledge transfer rather than knowledge
spillovers. Substituting demand into the prot function we can once more de-
rive prot maximizing equilibrium prices:
pd =
"Td (Pu + (1  )w)
("  1)
We can now also write down an explicit function for derived demand for
intermediate inputs:
I = nd(F
T
d + 
T
d xd)
Appendix B
B1 IJVs in the downstream sector - du=d
First consider the elements of du=d:
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IJV
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IJV
(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downstream price e¤ect <0
PE1  @xU
dPU
@Pu
@pu
@pu
@Tu
(m   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KT1   w [(Fm   Fu) + xu(m   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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for du=d:
du
d
=
"
wTuxu
   1 
 (nIJV + (1  )nd)
I
  w
#
| {z }
Term 1
(Fm   Fn)
+
wTuxu
   1
"
A1
IJV
+ 
Tu
(A1 +A2)
PU
PU+(1 )w +
A2
Sd
(1  )
+(nIJV xIV + (1  )ndxd) + ITu
#
| {z }
Term 2
(m   n)
where
A1  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd)nIJV ("  )

pIJV
PD
1 "
  "(nIJV IJV xIJV )
A2  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd)nd("  )

pd
PD
1 "
  "(ndSdxd)
In order to sign the derivative, note that the rst term in Term 1 is positive and
the second negative, so that Term 1 has an ambiguous sign. It can be shown
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that A1 < 0 as follows:
A1 < 0() XnIJV ("  )

pIJV
PD
1 "
< "(nIJV IJV xIJV )
, "  
"
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IJV
=
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=
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=
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IJV + nd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since pIJV = (IJV =
S
d )pd. Since " > , this condition will always hold, and
similarly for A2. Moreover, this also implies that A1 +A2 < 0: Indeed, we have
that:
A1 +A2 =  (nIJV IJV xIJV + ndSdxd) < 0
Note that we can rewrite Term 2 as follows:"
A1
IJV
+ 
Tu
(A1 +A2)
PU
PU+(1 )w +
A2
Sd
(1  )
+(nIJV xIV + (1  )ndxd) + ITu
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(A1 + nIJV 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where the sign of the rst and last term follow from the fact that A1; A2 < 0.15
The sign of the second term is ambiguous however. We can derive a condition
under which this term (and hence the entire Term 2) is negative, which obviously
is the case if the numerator is negative:
2 (A1 +A2)PU + I (PU + (1  )w)

= 

(nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd) [(1  )PU + (1  )w]
+(PU + (1  )w)(nIJV FIJV + ndFSd )

< 0
15Note that the condition in this case changes to ("  )=("  1) < 1 which still holds since
" >  > 1.
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For this condition to hold it is necessary to have:
(nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd)
(nIJV FIJV + ndFSd )
<  (1  )PU + (1  )w
PU + (1  )w
du=d if  = 1
If  = 1, Term 1 reduces to  w(Fm  Fn) > 0. Hence, a su¢ cient condition for
du=d > 0 then is:
(nIJV IJV xIJV + nd
S
dxd)
(nIJV FIJV + ndFSd )
<  (1  )PU + (1  )w
PU + (1  )w
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0, Term 1 is unambiguously positive and Term 2 unambiguously negative.
du
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9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
There is no concise su¢ cient or necessary condition which ensures du=d is
either positive or negative in this case.
B2 IJVs in the downstream sector - dd=d
The elements of dd=d are:
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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for dd=d:
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with
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Sd 
"
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PU
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Signing this derivate is not straightforward. Therefore, we consider its sign
under  = 1 and  = 0.
6.0.1 du=d if  = 1
If  = 1, dd=d reduces to:
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Note that a su¢ cient condition for dd=d to be positive is thus:
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Given that " >  > 1 the LHS of this condition < 1. Hence, if the RHS  1 the
condition is always met. It can be shown that RHS  1 by noting that we in
this case we need that pd  pIJV :
pd  pIJV
() "
S
d (PU + (1  )w)
("  1) 
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() 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n
Since we have assumed that m < n this condition is always met for for all
 2 [0; 1].
32
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0, dd=d reduces to:
dd
d
= ("  )pd
"
xdP
" 1
D

ndp
1 "
d
Sd
+
nIJV p
1 "
IJV
IJV

(m   n)
 (PU + (1  )w) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
=

("  )pd
"
P " 1D

ndp
1 "
d
Sd
+
nIJV p
1 "
IJV
IJV

  (PU + (1  )w)

xd(m   n)
 (PU + (1  )w)(Fm   Fd)
=

("  )pd
"
P " 1D

ndp
1 "
d
Sd
+
nIJV p
1 "
IJV
IJV

  ("  1) pd
"Sd

xd(m   n)
 (PU + (1  )w)(Fm   Fd)
Note that a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 is:
("  )
("  1)

ndp
1 "
d
Sd
+
nIJV p
1 "
IJV
IJV

<
P 1 "D
Sd
If Sd = IJV this condition reduces to:
("  )
("  1)

ndp
1 "
d + nIJV p
1 "
IJV
Sd

<
P 1 "D
Sd
("  )
("  1)

P 1 "D
Sd

<
P 1 "D
Sd
("  )
("  1) < 1
which as we saw above is always the case. Given that Sd = d + (1  )IJV
and the fact that  = 0, we indeed have that Sd = IJV so that this condition
always holds.
B3 IJVs in upstream sector - du=d
First consider the elements of du=d:
IDL2 = 
wSu
(   1)
@xu
@I

@I
@FTd
(Fm   Fd) + @I
@Td
(m   d)

PE3 =
wSu
(   1)
@xu
@PU
(m   d)

@PU
@pu
@pu
@Su
(1  ) + @PU
@pIJV
@pIJV
@IJV

KS2 =  w(1  ) [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for du=d:
du
d
= nd
pu

xu
I
[(Fm   Fn) + xd(m   n)]
+xupuP
 1
U (m   n)
w
   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

 w(1  ) [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
The elements of dd=d are:
PE4 =
pd
"
@xd
@PD
@PD
@pd
(m   n)
24 @pd@Td 
+ @pd@PU

@PU
@pu
@pu
@Su
(1  ) + @PU@pIJV
@pIJV
@IJV
 35
KT2 =  (PU + (1  )w) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
FL1 =  

Td xd + F
T
d

(1  )@PU
@pu
@pu
@Su
+
@PU
@pIJV
@pIJV
@IJV

(m   n)
Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for dd=d:
dd
d
=
xd
"
(m   n)
"
 pd
Td
+PU
"Td
(" 1)
w
 1 ((1  )nup u + nIJV p IJV )
#
 (PU + (1  )w) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
 

Td xd + F
T
d

(m   n)PU
w
   1((1  )nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )
It is clear that the rs two lines of this expression are positive, while the
third line is negative.
du=d if  = 1
If  = 1 du=d reduces to:
du
d
= nd
pu

xu
I
[(Fm   Fn) + xd(m   n)]
+xupuP
 1
U (m   n)
w
   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

which is clearly negative. Hence if  = 1, du=d < 0.
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0 du=d reduces to:
du
d
= xupuP
 1
U (m   n)
w
   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

 w [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
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Hence, a su¢ cient and necessary condition to have that du=d > 0 in this case
is that:
puP
 1
U

   1
 
nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV

<
[(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   n)

   1
 
nup
1 
u + nIJV pup
 
IJV
 
nup
1 
u + nIJV p
1 
IJV
 < [(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   n)
Given that  = 0 we have that IJV = 
S
u and hence that pu = pIJV i.e:

   1 <
[(Fm   Fd) + xu(m   n)]
xu(m   n)
Hence, the larger xed costs relative to marginal costs (or more precisely: The
more important the e¤ect of knowledge di¤usion on xed rather than marginal
costs), the more likely this condition is to hold, and hence, the more likely it is
that du=d > 0
B4 IJVs in the upstream sector - dd=d
The elements of dd=d are:
PE4 =
Td (PU + (1  )w)
("  1)
@xd
@PD
@PD
@pd
24 @pd@Td (m   n)
+ @pd@PU

@PU
@pu
@pu
@Su
(1  ) + @PU@pIJV
@pIJV
@IJV

(m   n)
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Using the explicit expressions for the partial derivatives and collecting terms
yields the following expression for dd=d:
dd
d
=
xd
"
(m   n)
"
 pd
Td
+PU
"Td
(" 1)
w
 1 ((1  )nup u + nIJV p IJV )
#
 (PU + (1  )w) [(Fm   Fd) + xd(m   n)]
 

Td xd + F
T
d

(m   n)PU
w
   1((1  )nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )
Clearly, the term in the rst line is negative whereas the terms in the second
and third lines are negative. From the analyses below it follows that " > 2 is a
su¢ cient condition for du=d to be positive.
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du=d if  = 1
If  = 1 dd=d reduces to:
dd
d
=
xdpd
"
(m   n)
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Td
+PU
"Td
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w
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T
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
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n)PU
w
   1(nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
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
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 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )(m   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T
d
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
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T
d
#
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"
(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
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T
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T
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#
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 when  = 1 is " > 2.
du=d if  = 0
If  = 0 dd=d reduces to:
dd
d
= PU
w
   1(nup
 
u + nIJV p
 
IJV )(m   n) "
xd
T
d (2  ")
("  1)   F
T
d
#
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for dd=d > 0 when  = 0 is " > 2.
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations
1 2 3 4 6 7
1. Productivity
2. Horizontal 0.15
3. Backward 0.16 0.16
4. Forward 0.17 0.39 0.22
6. (Log) Size 0.17 -0.04 0.08 -0.00
7. Market share 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.52
Mean 5.03 4.40 0.50 1.46 12.8 0.07
St. Dev. 1.88 8.66 0.77 3.65 1.87 0.14
Table 3: Semiparametric model esimates
(1) Horizontal (2) Backward (3) Forward
(log) Size
0:124
(:042)
0:163
(:025)
0:162
(:023)
Market Share
0:634
(:397)
0:387
(:160)
0:280
(:156)
V 2:85 2:61 2:67
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0:29 0:53 0:52
N 1; 195 2; 462 2; 462
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;
*** p<0.01 (b) Estimator based on Lokshin (2006) with 1st-order di¤erencing
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Table 4: Parametric model esimates
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal
0:047
(:017)
0:100
(:053)
0:057
(:022)
Horizontal Squared
 0:001
(:001)
 0:004
(:002)
 0:001
(:001)
Horizontal Cubed ( 100) 0:000
(:000)
0:002
(:001)
0:000
(:000)
Backward
0:168
(:146)
0:014
(:340)
0:420
(:203)
Backward Squared
 0:003
(:002)
0:001
(:004)
 0:008
(:003)
Forward
0:004
(:073)
 0:087
(:058)
0:100
(:220)
Forward Squared
0:000
(:001)
0:001
(:001)
 0:002
(:004)
(log) Size
0:205
(:050)
0:183
(:076)
0:206
(:046)
Market Share
0:847
(:265)
1:24
(:492)
0:785
(:359)
Constant
0:138
(:643)
 1:60
(:847)
2:74
(:574)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.79 0.78 0.79
N 6,579 1,855 4,724
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
(b) Robust standard errors with industry-level clustering (c) Low IPP < 4.19 on Ginarte and
Park (1996) index
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Table 5: Parametric model esimates - Interactions
(1) Total Sample (2) Low IPP (3) High IPP
Horizontal
0:046
(:018)
0:145
(:062)
0:061
(:020)
Horizontal  [(F + L)=L] -  0:014

(:004)
-
Horizontal Squared
 0:001
(:001)
 0:004
(:002)
 0:001
(:000)
Horizontal Squared  [(F + L)=L] - 0:0004

(:0001)
-
Horizontal Cubed ( 100) 0:000
(:000)
0:003
(:001)
0:0006
(:0003)
Horizontal Cubed [(F + L)=L]
( 100) -
 0:0003
(:0001)
-
Backward
0:147
(:147)
 0:183
(:375)
0:437
(:192)
Backward Squared
 0:003
(:002)
0:011
(:006)
 0:009
(:003)
Forward
0:189
(:102)
0:274
(:255)
0:466
(:263)
Forward  Herndahl  0:550

(:146)
 1:15
(:506)
 1:05
(:326)
Forward Squared
 0:002
(:001)
 0:003
(:003)
 0:008
(:005)
Forward Squared Herndahl 0:007

(:002)
0:013
(:006)
0:016
(:006)
(log) Size
0:196
(:050)
0:147
(:069)
0:195
(:044)
Market Share
1:03
(:287)
1:92
(:567)
1:00
(:345)
Constant
0:208
(:654)
 1:04
(1:45)
2:92
(:584)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.79 0.80 0.79
N 6,579 1,404 4,724
Dependent variable is log of rm productivity. Notes: (a) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (b) Robust
standard errors with industry-level clustering (c) Low IPP < 4.19 on Ginarte and Park (1997) index
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Table A1: Sample countries and industries
Countries Industries
Australia Mining of coal
Austria Mining of metal oares
Belgium Food products and beverages
Canada Textiles
Denmark Wood and wood products
Finland Paper and paper products
France Coke, petroleum and fuel
Germany Chemicals and chemical products
Hong Kong Rubber and plastic products
Israel Other non-metallic and mineral products
Italy Basic metals
Japan Fabricated metal products
South Korea Machinery and equipment
Netherlands Electrical machinery and apparatus
Singapore Medical, precision and optical instruments
Spain Motor vehicles
Sweden Furniture
Switzerland Construction
United Kingdom
United States
41
Figure 1: Schematic representation of horizontal and vertical linkages
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Figure 2: Semiparametric relationship between rm productivity and MNE own-
ership
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